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Corporate Governance, Corporate Finance and Stock Markets in Emerging 
Countries 
 
I  Introduction. Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets: The 
National and International Policy Context 
 
Corporate governance has only recently become the object of serious public concern 
and policy interest in emerging markets. The Asian crisis of 1997-2000 which 
devastated some of the world's most successful economies provided a catalyst for 
such concerns. An analysis of the crisis by some economists and policy makers led to 
the formulation of an influential thesis which ascribed its deeper causes to structural 
factors. This thesis, propounded notably by leading U.S. officials (for example Alan 
Greenspan (1998) and the former Treasury Secretary, Larry Summers (1998))1 
suggested that, although certain macro-economic disequilibria may have initiated the 
Asian economic and financial upheaval, its more fundamental causes lay in the 
normal day-to-day micro-economic behaviour of economic agents in these countries. 
According to this theory, the close relationship between governments, business and 
banks, which characterised these economies, led to crony capitalism and high debt-
equity ratios for the large favoured firms. It is further argued that poor corporate 
governance and the lack of competition in product and capital markets resulted in 
over-investment which in turn led to falling profits and ultimately the crisis. 
 
Although this structuralist thesis is controversial and has been the subject of 
important criticisms explicitly or implicitly by a number of economists2, it did help 
focus attention on corporate governance and related micro-economic issues in 
developing countries. Even before the Asian crisis, such refocusing was needed in any 
case because of important structural changes which had occurred in these countries 
during the 1980s and the early 1990s. In this period many of them liberalised their 
financial systems, privatised and deregulated their industries, created and expanded 
their stock markets and embarked on a whole series of market-oriented reforms. This 
                                                          
1 See also Summers (2000), Frankel (1998), Phelps (1999), Johnson et al. (2000), IMF (1997, 1998), 
US Council For Economic Advisors (1998, 1999). 
2 See for example Chang (2000), Sakakibara (2001), Singh and Weisse (1999), and Stiglitz (1999). 
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ascendancy of the private sector needs to be carefully studied from a developmental 
perspective. (Singh, 1997).  
 
Thus matters of private sector corporate governance became important for emerging 
countries well before the Asian crisis but were not recognised as a subject for 
concern. What the crisis did was to make this phenomenon not just one of national but 
of international significance. The latter was further enhanced by the inclusion of 
corporate governance in the reform agenda of the New International Financial 
Architecture (NIFA). The NIFA was instituted by G7 countries in the wake of the 
Asian crisis to forestall future crises.3 The alleged lack of corporate transparency in 
emerging markets was a particular focus of G7 concern (Camdessus, 1998).  
 
In the context of the current international debate on poverty and development there is 
also another notable reason for the attention being focused today on corporate 
governance in emerging markets. This stems from the emphasis in international 
development policies on governance questions at all levels. Corporate governance is 
clearly highly relevant to these concerns. As James Wolfensohn (2000:1), President of 
the World Bank, observed, "The proper governance of companies will become as 
crucial to the world economy as the proper governing of countries".  
 
This paper focuses on the inter-relationship between corporate governance, corporate 
finance and the expansion and development of stock markets in emerging countries. It 
explores both theoretically and empirically the nature of the inter-relationships 
between these phenomena, as well as their implications for economic policy. It 
concentrates specifically on the financing of corporate growth, an area of work where 
the literature has identified important anomalies in relation to corporate governance, 
and the savings and investment behaviour of economic agents. The paper provides 
new information and analysis on this subject for the 1990s which leads to further 
anomalies from the perspective of extant economic theory. It addresses the following 
main issues: 
 
                                                          
3 See further Singh, Singh and Weisse (2002). 
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(1) How do corporate financing patterns theoretically affect corporate governance? 
How does the latter in turn influence the former? 
(2) What is the nature of corporate financing patterns (i.e. how corporations finance 
their investments and growth) in emerging markets, and how have these evolved 
during the 1980s and 1990s? 
(3) Are there significant differences in financing patterns (a) between emerging and 
mature markets, and, (b) between emerging markets themselves. 
(4) Can economic theory adequately explain the observed inter-country differences in 
financing patterns as well as the changes in these over time? 
(5) How does the stock market affect corporate finance and corporate governance? 
 
In addition the paper also comments very briefly on the work of La Porta and Lopez 
de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (LLSV). These authors in their pioneering 
contributions have emphasised the role of the legal system in determining the 
relationship between corporate finance, corporate governance and economic 
development. (LLSV, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000). In considering these issues, the paper 
examines more closely the evolution of the financing of corporate growth and of stock 
market development in the specific case of the Indian economy in the 1980s and 
1990s.  
 
II Corporate Financing Patterns in Emerging and Mature Economies: 
Analytical Considerations  
 
4The paper builds on the author's previous work in this field . Singh and Hamid (1992) 
and Singh (1995) were among the first large-scale comparative empirical analyses of 
corporate financing patterns in emerging markets (hereafter referred to as SH)5.  SH 
arrived at surprising and quite unexpected conclusions.  This research showed that 
although there were variations in corporate financing patterns among developing 
                                                          
4 See Singh and Hamid (1992), Singh (1995), Whittington et al. (1997), Singh (1997), Singh and 
Weisse (1998) and Glen et. al. (2000). 
5 The sample frame of Singh and Hamid (1992) was the fifty largest manufacturing corporations 
quoted on the stock markets in nine emerging countries, Thailand, South Korea, India, Turkey, 
Pakistan, Mexico, Jordan, Zimbabwe and Malaysia. Singh (1995) extended the coverage normally to 
the one hundred largest quoted manufacturing firms in each country and included Brazil in the sample 
of emerging markets. The latter study, while broadly confirming the conclusions of the earlier research, 
also qualified them in some important ways. (See further Singh and Weisse (1998) and also below). 
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countries, in general corporations in the sample countries used more external than 
internal funds to finance the growth of their net assets. Further, within external 
sources, the average developing country corporation used new share issues on the 
stock market to a surprisingly large degree. Even at an elementary level these 
conclusions are quite contrary to a priori expectations. In view of the low level of 
development and myriad imperfections of developing country capital markets, one 
would have expected these corporations to use more internal rather than external 
finance. For similar reasons, one would not expect immature and small stock markets 
to be a prominent source of funds for developing country corporations. 
 
An important task of the present paper is to examine the robustness of the SH findings 
in the light of the evidence for the 1990s. The SH studies analysed the individual 
corporate accounts of normally the hundred largest manufacturing firms quoted on the 
stock market and covered the decade of the 1980s. However, before reporting on the 
robustness exercise and other empirical results, it will be useful to outline more 
systematically what economic theory has to say on corporate financing patterns in 
developed and developing countries. During the last fifteen years there has been an 
avalanche of theoretical literature on the financing of corporate growth and the 
associated question of the capital structure of firms6. The literature points to a number 
of reasons why financing patterns (based on flow variables) or the capital structure 
(based on stock variables) may differ between firms. As suggested by Myers (2001), 
these reasons lead broadly to the following four theories: 
 
(1) The trade-off theory which emphasises the role of  taxation. 
 
(2) The pecking order theory which is based on the concept of informational 
asymmetries. 
 
(3)  The agency theory which is based on the separation of ownership and control in 
modern corporations in mature economies. This theory emphasises the role of 
corporate financial choices in aligning the interests of shareholders and managers. 
                                                          
6 The seminal review article on the theoretical issues is Harris and Raviv (1991). An authoritative 
recent contribution is Myers (2001). 
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 (4) Modigliani and Miller's 1958 classic irrelevance theorems which long dominated 
the field of corporate finance and which asserted that it made no difference how 
firms financed their growth. 
 
The first three theories represent attempts to reconcile empirical evidence for the real 
world that financing patterns do seem to matter with the Modigliani and Miller 
propositions. It is now recognised that the latter only hold in a rarefied neo-classical 
world in which there is notably no taxation, no provision for bankruptcy, and where 
there exist stable competitive equilibrium prices. In relation to the differences in 
financing patterns between emerging and mature markets, which is the main subject 
of concern in this paper, the most important of these theories are the pecking order 
theory and the agency theory. The taxation theory (trade-off theory) is more relevant 
at the empirical level. However, in view of the limited availability of comparative 
inter-country data on taxation, the latter issues will be considered here only briefly.  
 
II.1 The Pecking Order Theory 
 
This theory suggests that firms follow a hierarchical pattern in their choice of various 
sources to finance their investment needs, internal finance (i.e. retained profits) being 
the first recourse. Should these requirements exceed the available internal finance, 
firms will then attempt to raise external resources through debt and only as a last 
resort go to the stock market. The pecking order theory has a ready rationale if one 
assumes that managers' interests differ from those of shareholders as, for example, in 
corporations where there is a separation of ownership from control. This would make 
the controlling managers prefer internal finance over which they have discretion 
(because of the inability of dispersed shareholders to exercise effective control due to 
the difficulties of collective action). External finance on the other hand involves 
scrutiny by the stock market or by banks. However, in a classic contribution Myers 
and Majluf (1984) showed that, under conditions of imperfect and asymmetric 
information, even profit maximising managers, that is, those who are trying to 
maximise shareholders' value, will find that the optimum financial choices are still 
best represented by the pecking order theory.  
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 II.2 The Case of Emerging Markets: Pecking Order and Agency 
Considerations 
 
The next question is whether at a theoretical level the pecking order theory may be 
expected to apply also to emerging market corporations. Here we must first note some 
specificities of emerging countries. These are in part related to the level of overall 
development of a country and that of its capital markets. At low levels of 
development where the stock market is either non-existent or exists only in a 
rudimentary form, and there is a banking system which is also not fully developed, 
corporations would normally be obliged to rely basically on internal resources and 
seek external funds rarely, if at all. 
 
In practice, however, the banking system in such economies is likely to be relatively 
more developed compared with the stock market, even though it would still be far 
from being perfect. This will mean that firms will be able to raise external funds more 
from the banks than from the stock market. In other words this would lead to a 
“pecking order” of the same kind as is suggested for advanced economies but for 
entirely different reasons. The pecking order in the case of the developing countries 
would be further reinforced by the fact that business-owning families would like to 
maintain control of their firms and would therefore prefer debt to equity. 
 
Another characteristic of developing country firms which is relevant, particularly for 
small and medium size companies, is that of family connections. For such firms, the 
normal sources of external capital are equity from extended family and friends and 
loans from the “kerb” market. It is not clear in this regard whether these firms would 
borrow more or use more equity. Kerb borrowing and informal credit market 
borrowing tend to be very costly but are often required by small and medium sized 
firms for short-term working capital. For long term purposes, equity finance from 
families and friends is likely to be preferred. This implies that the growth of small and 
medium sized firms would be restricted by financial constraints unless there are 
government schemes to help them. Governments in many developing countries have 
established direct financing institutions (DFIs), essentially development banks, to 
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provide finance for industrialisation. Typically, however, these institutions have 
tended to provide funds for large rather than small companies. To the extent that such 
finance is extended to large firms in the form of loans rather than equity, this would 
also lead to the consolidation of the pecking order pattern of finance for the large 
corporations. 
 
Turning to the case of emerging countries at a relatively higher stage of development 
with better developed banking systems and established stock markets, there will be 
further reasons to expect the pecking order to prevail. In these semi-industrial 
countries, although there are likely to exist reasonably sophisticated banking systems, 
the stock markets, until the 1980s, in most of these countries were quite small and 
relatively immature (Singh (1997) Mullins (1993)). Specifically, imperfections of the 
stock market may lead to speculation and arbitrary pricing as well as large volatility 
in share prices (see further Tirole, 1991 and Singh, 1997). These conditions may 
discourage risk-averse firms, even those with very good projects, from seeking funds 
from the stock market or even from obtaining a stock market listing at all. Further, 
due to the lack of clear-cut bankruptcy laws, or their lax enforcement, large firms in 
particular many semi-industrial countries, may be expected to resort to bank financing 
more than to the stock market. 
 
To sum up, the above discussion suggests that, although conditions differ both 
between emerging countries at various stages of development and between small and 
large firms, there are good reasons to suggest that the pecking order theory would be 
applicable at least for large firms. For semi-industrial countries with reasonably well-
developed banking systems and established equity markets, such as those included in 
SH studies, large corporations would follow a pecking order pattern of finance not 
only because of the informational asymmetries emphasized by Myers and Majluf, 
(1984) but also due to the institutional specificities of emerging markets outlined 
above. Thus, if there are good reasons to expect a pecking order pattern of finance for 
corporate growth in developed countries, on account of ownership patterns and 
agency considerations outlined above, there are even stronger reasons for expecting 
such a pattern in emerging markets. 
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II.3    Research on Law and Finance and Emerging Markets 
 
Apart from the economic theories of financing corporate growth outlined in II.2 
above, LLSV's work referred to earlier suggests that a country's legal system 
determines its pattern of corporate finance as well as corporate governance and other 
variables. In their empirical work, the authors distinguish between essentially two 
ideal type legal systems: the French civil law system and the Anglo-Saxon common 
law system. It is argued that common law countries would have better protection for 
minority shareholders, as well as superior corporate governance in other ways (e.g. 
have regular board meetings and have independent non-executive directors). This 
would enable corporations in those countries to be able to raise more external finance 
at cheaper terms than corporations in civil law countries. In this framework the 
country's legal system is an exogenous variable determined by history and 
circumstances. In the case of emerging markets, it is suggested that their respective 
legal systems were often imposed on them by the colonial power which had ruled the 
country. The LLSV theory is controversial but it has the virtue of having clear-cut 
testable predictions concerning financing patterns in different emerging as well as 
mature markets. 
 
III  Empirical Evidence 
 
Singh and Hamid's results, referred to earlier, for the corporate financing patterns in 
ten emerging markets for the 1980s are reported in Table 1. These results are based on 
individual company accounting data for normally the hundred largest manufacturing 
firms in each of the sample countries. The results indicate a comprehensive rejection 
of the pecking order hypothesis for several countries. The average quoted company in 
the ten emerging markets during the 1980s financed marginally more of its growth of 
net assets from equity (39.3%) than from internal sources i.e. retained profits 
(38.8%).7 Long term debt contributed a little over 20% to the average sample firm's 
growth. These were the average figures: in some countries the significance of external 
finance was considerably greater. Thus, for example, in South Korea nearly 80% of 
                                                          
7 Net assets refers to the book value of a firm's total assets minus current liabilities.  
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corporate growth came from external sources (nearly 50% equity and 30% long-term 
debt) and only about 20% from retained profits. 
 
III.1  Anomalous Behaviour: Emerging  Market Corporations and Investors 
` 
The results reported in Table 1 are striking and anomalous for other reasons as well.  
Not only would it seem that large emerging market corporations finance a great part 
of their investment needs from external rather than internal funds, they also used the 
stock market for new issues to a surprisingly large degree, much more so than the 
corporations in advanced countries.  (See Table 2).  Tables 2 and 3, which report on 
the financing of corporate growth in advanced countries for the periods 1970 - 1989 
and for 1988 - 1997 respectively, suggest that in these countries the stock market 
provides relatively little fresh capital to the corporate sector.  Indeed the contribution 
of new equity to corporate investment was negative in the U.S. and the U.K. (see 
Table 2), indicating that more company shares were retired either through take-overs 
or through share buy-backs than were added by new issues during the relevant period.  
However, even in Germany and Japan where new equity makes a positive 
contribution to corporate growth, the proportions are quite small.  To find that, 
compared with these well-organised stock markets in advanced countries, the 
considerably smaller less developed and immature emerging markets make a sizeable 
contribution to financing corporate investment certainly calls for an explanation. 
 
This is all the more necessary since developing country stock markets suffer not just 
from market imperfections (for example, a comparative lack of private information-
gathering and monitoring organisations and firms) but also from serious regulatory 
deficits (including insider trading, lack of protection for minority shareholders).8  In 
addition, as the conceptual analysis of the last section suggested, the share prices on 
these emerging markets are likely to be much more volatile than in well-developed 
and mature stock markets. This particular prediction is supported by evidence which 
indicates that there is indeed a greater share price volatility on emerging markets.9 
                                                          
8 Such deficits exist, as we know from the recent experience of the United States, in advanced 
countries as well but they tend to be much larger in emerging markets with new stock market 
institutions.  
9 See further El-Erian and Kumar (1994). 
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One would have expected such volatility to discourage developing country firms from 
raising capital on the stock market, or even to seek a market listing at all.  However, 
as Table 1 suggests, not only did these companies tap the stock market for large 
amounts of fresh capital, but further data (not reported in Table 1) indicates that there 
was a big increase in listings in many emerging markets in the 1980s. Singh (1995, 
1997). 
 
Even though India is an extreme case, by the late 1980s the relatively small Indian 
stock market (by international standards) had become one of the largest in the world 
in terms of the number of listed companies.10  Shleifer and Vishny (1997) point to 
another anomaly, looked at this time from the perspective of the investing public 
rather than the corporations.  They rightly ask "Who are the buyers of this equity?  If 
they are dispersed shareholders, why are they buying the equity despite the apparent 
absence of minority protections?" 
 
A still further anomaly arises when the results for advanced countries reported in 
Tables 2 and 3 are considered. These evidently fully conform to the pecking order 
theory of financing corporate growth, indicating that firms in these countries 
overwhelmingly finance their investments from internal sources.  When external 
sources are used debt is much more important than equity.  The analytical discussion 
of Section II suggested that, compared with the advanced country corporations, there 
are even stronger a priori reasons to expect corporations in emerging markets to 
follow the pecking order.  Yet evidence suggests that the former do so and the latter 
do not. 
 
 
III.2  Accounting for the Anomalies 
 
How does one account for these anomalies?  Singh (1995) and in subsequent papers 
with his colleagues referred to earlier, offered the following analysis for explaining 
these contrary findings.  First he pointed out that a large part of the difference 
between the results for the emerging and advanced markets reported in Tables 1 and 2 
                                                          
10 See further Singh and Weisse (1998) and Singh (1999) 
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(and 3) arises from methodological differences between the two types of studies.  The 
following differences are particularly significant: 
• The sources of basic data used in the two studies are rather different - 
Table 1 is based on corporate accounting data and Table 2 (as well as 
Table 3) on the flow-of-funds data. More significantly, an important part 
of the differences in the empirical results could arise from the fact that in 
tables 2 and 3 depreciation is included as a major component of internal 
finance, whereas in Table 1 it is excluded from both the numerator and 
denominator in the relevant ratios.  The purpose of the SH exercise in 
Table 1 is to measure the sources of finance for corporate growth of “net 
assets”.  It is therefore necessary to focus on the net increase in corporate 
assets, because depreciation provision for replacement is normally 
required to merely maintain the stock of assets.  Prais (1976) provides the 
classic discussion of this issue. 
 
• Equally importantly, the results reported in tables 2 and 3, using the flow 
of funds data, relate to the corporate sector as a whole, rather than to a 
typical individual firm.  In this methodology, intra-corporate sector 
transactions are usually netted-out and “external finance” means finance 
from outside the corporate sector.  Therefore the question being addressed 
by the information presented in tables 2 and 3 is: how is “gross physical 
investment” in the corporate sector as a whole financed, by internal 
sources (within the corporate sector) and by external sources (from outside 
the sector, e.g. the financial or the household sector).  This is a rather 
different question than that addressed in Table 1 by the SH methodology.  
The latter uses firm-level accounting data to enquire how individual 
corporations rather than the corporate sector as a whole finance the growth 
of their net assets, net of depreciation.  
 
 
• The differences between the two methodologies is best illustrated by 
considering the case of take-overs. If a corporation, for example, within 
the non-financial sector takes over another corporation within that sector, 
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and pays for the acquisition with its own shares, this is regarded by SH as 
a new investment by the acquiring firm, financed through the issue of fresh 
equity.  The rationale for this approach is that, from the point of view of 
the individual firm, growth by acquisition is an alternative to the creation 
of new productive capacity.  From the standpoint of the corporate sector as 
a whole, however, there is no increase at all either in “physical 
investment” or in the shares issued.  Thus in the methodology used in 
tables 2 and 3 such intra-sectoral transactions are netted out.  
 
Singh (1995) provided indirect evidence to suggest that the differences between the 
financing pattern of advanced and developing country corporations are very much 
smaller when the same methodology is used for both groups of firms.11  The next 
section provides direct evidence on this point. 
 
Quite apart from the methodological differences noted above some of the anomalous 
results could, however, also arise from the possible measurement biases in SH 
studies12.  The latter were fully acknowledged in Singh (1995) and examined more 
closely in Whittington, Saporta and Singh (1997).  Two of the possible biases are 
particularly relevant: a) the use of the historical cost method of accounting in periods 
of high inflation; and b) in the absence of the necessary data, a bias is introduced by 
using an indirect method to assess the contribution of the equity variables in SH 
research. 
 
As is well known, inflation could distort the historic cost accounts to give a 
misleading picture of corporate performance and financing patterns.  For example, a 
priori it could either understate or overstate corporate profits (and consequently the 
amount of retained profits) unless an appropriate adjustment has been made.  With 
respect to (b), in SH studies, in the absence of readily available data, the variable 
"equity finance" was measured indirectly from the accounting identity which equates 
growth of net assets with the sum of internal and external finance respectively. 
Further in these studies the growth of long-term liabilities was proxied by growth of 
                                                          
11 This qualified an important conclusion of Singh and Hamid (1992). See further Singh (1995), p.21 
and also Singh and Weisse (1998). 
12 See also Cobham and Subramaniam (1998) and Samuel (1996). 
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long-term debt and the growth of internal finance by retained profits.  Whittington et 
al (1997) in their analysis of these biases indicate that, although significant in some 
cases they do not vitiate the surprising central empirical findings of SH studies, that 
is, that large developing country corporations use more external than internal finance 
and employ equity finance to a rather large degree. 
 
Singh (1995) provided an economic explanation for these anomalous findings, 
essentially in terms of conjunctural factors which were specific to the 1980s and were 
expected eventually to peter out.  He ascribed the relatively high use of external 
finance by developing country corporations to their fast growth rates.  He then 
concentrated on the question of the large reliance of these corporations on equity 
finance. He attributed this phenomenon to financial liberalisation, de-regulation and 
privatisation which many developing countries implemented in the 1980's.  
Specifically he called attention to the following factors: 
 
a) The very fast development of stock markets which was stimulated 
and encouraged by governments through regulatory changes and other 
measures.  In many emerging countries an important purpose of these 
policies was to facilitate privatisation. 
 
b) Equity financing was also encouraged in a number of countries by 
tax incentives. 
 
c) External and internal financial liberalisation which often lead both 
to a stock market boom and to higher real interest rates; the former 
lowered the cost of equity capital whilst the latter increased the cost of 
debt finance.  These changes in relative prices, which were quite dramatic, 
are likely to have contributed to the observed greater use of equity 
compared with debt by large corporations in a number of these economies 
during this period.13 
 
IV  Empirical Evidence for the 1990s 
                                                          
13 These issues are of course more complex; for a detailed discussion see Singh (1995). 
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 This section provides a unified analysis of corporate financing patterns in emerging 
and advanced economies during the 1990s using the same methodology and the same 
data source - the World Scope Data Bank.  This data bank is more comprehensive 
than the accounting information used in SH studies.  Apart from its intrinsic interest 
in describing the corporate financing patterns for the 1990s, the results of this analysis 
also have a bearing on the issue of measurement biases outlined above.   
 
Tables 4 - 7 analyse corporate financing patterns in four emerging markets (India, 
Malaysia, Thailand and Korea), and two mature economies (the U.S. and the U.K.), 
during the period 1992 to 1996 using the same methodology, essentially that of SH 
studies in Table 1 (but see discussion later in this section). The results reported in 
Table 4 provide fascinating information which may be summarised as follows: 
 
i) The differences between the corporate financing patterns for mature and for 
emerging economies are much less marked, when the same methodology and 
the same information, that is, the corporate accounting data, are used to 
examine financing patterns. 
 
ii) The pecking order pattern of finance is not supported either for emerging 
markets or for mature economies14. 
 
iii) There are marked differences between the two mature economies.  In the 
U.K., internal finance provides only 12.6% of the total sources of finance.  Of 
the external finance (87.3%) more than one third is provided by equity issues, 
which is very considerably more than in the U.S. (8.4%). It is also notable that 
short term debt, including trade credit, comprises 48.9% of the total financing 
for the U.K. firms and only 28.1% for the U.S. firms.  Indeed the pattern of 
financing for the U.K. companies seems similar to those for developing 
countries. 
                                                          
14 In the case of the U.K., the rejection of the hypothesis is unequivocal.  For the US the results are 
more marginal especially if the information in Table 5 is also taken into account.  The latter which 
excludes short term external financing indicates that marginally more finance came from internal 
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 iv) In the U.S., however, internal finance accounted for 31.8% and long term 
debt finance 30.6%, marginally less than internal finance. However, long term 
external finance as a whole greatly exceeded internal finance.   
 
v) The results for developing countries indicate their continuing heavy 
reliance on external sources (ranging from 76% for India to 94% for Korea).  
However, the composition of external finance is different from that of the 
1980s: there is greater use of debt finance, particularly short term debt, than 
that of equity issues. 
 
It is useful to note that although it employs the same type of methodology as that in 
Table 1, the table 4 analysis is more comprehensive.  The results are also less subject 
to some of the possible measurement biases, which, as noted earlier, could affect the 
analysis presented in Table 1.  Differences between the analyses of Tables 1 and 4 
may be summarised as follows: 
 
• Table 4, using the World Scope data set, measures the contribution of equity 
finance directly, as this data base provides that information, whereas in table 1 
SH used an indirect residual method for estimating this variable because of 
data limitations; 
 
• The “external sources of finance” in table 4 includes all types of finance, long 
term as well as short term, including trade credit and short-term debt, whereas 
table 1 did not include short term finance, that is bank loans of a duration of 
up to one year.  As subsequent events revealed this was not a good 
methodology: long term debt is not an adequate reflection of the normal 
indebtness of developing country corporations.  This is because the latter 
typically use large amounts of short term debt for long term investment 
purposes.  Such debt is normally rolled over, turning it into the functional 
                                                                                                                                                                      
sources than from long term debt.  However long term external finance as a whole greatly exceeded 
internal finance. 
 16
equivalent of long term debt.  Creditors may, however, refuse to roll over 
these debts in times of crisis, as exemplified by the Asian crisis of 1997-1998; 
 
• Table 4 includes a separate category for revaluation reserves, minority 
interests, preferred shares and non-equity reserves.  This category is usually 
quite small for most countries.   
 
However, Table 5 provides the same information as table 4 except that it only 
examines long term sources of finance. This makes it more comparable to the data 
reported in table 1 except for the differences already noted in the first and third bullet 
points above. 
 
Taking Tables 4 and 5 together, the results raise three substantive economic issues in 
the context of the previous discussion: 
 
1. In the case of the U.S. and the U.K. corporations, especially the latter, the 
results do not provide much support for the pecking order theory. 
However, economic analysis as well as evidence in Tables 2 and 3 indicate 
otherwise.  Why should this be so? 
 
2. Why are the results reported for the U.S. so different from those for the 
U.K. in other respects, particularly as these countries have similar legal 
and financial institutions and well-developed stock markets? 
 
3. Are the apparent changes in equity financing in the 1990s compared with 
the 1980s in emerging markets "genuine" or simply a consequence of the 
measurement biases in the 1980s benchmark figures?  
 
The answer to the first question is implicit in the methodological discussion of the last 
section.  Different methodologies are being used in the two sets of tables and the main 
question therefore is, which method is more appropriate?  There are good reasons to 
suggest that the SH type methodology used in Tables 4 and 5 is more suitable, 
essentially because it is considering the issue of financing corporate growth from the 
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perspective of an individual firm rather than that of the corporate sector as a whole.  
The theoretical discussion of the pecking order hypothesis in Section II, it will be 
recalled, is conducted in terms of the behaviour of the individual firm rather than that 
of the whole of the corporate sector. 
 
With respect to the second question, the differences in the sources of finance for 
corporate growth in the U.S. and the U.K. appear to arise mainly from the fact that the 
World Scope data set for the . relates to the top 200 or so corporations, whereas for 
the U.K., it covers 700 corporations. (In this whole exercise, all available relevant 
information from the World Scope data set for each country has been used.)  It is 
therefore likely that the main reason for the differences between the U.S. and the U.K. 
arise from the fact that the financing patterns of large corporations are different from 
those of small corporations.  This hypothesis will be examined in subsequent work. 
 
Turning to the third question, since the World Scope data only starts in 1990, this 
question cannot be answered directly.  However, the data set does provide 
information for an indirect test of the effects of possible measurement errors in the 
treatment of the equity financing variable in the benchmark SH studies for the 1980s.  
Tables 6 and 7 use World Scope Data for the 1990s for a sample of four countries 
(India, Korea, Thailand and Malaysia) to analyse financing patterns using the direct 
method for measuring the contribution of equity finance (Table 6) and the SH residual 
method in Table 7.15 A comparison of Tables 6 and 7 indicates that for both India and 
Korea, the residual method slightly underestimates the contribution of equity finance, 
while in the case of Malaysia it considerably over-estimates it.  Both methods give the 
same results for Thailand.  Thus, in three out of four countries, this analysis suggests 
that the SH method is unlikely to have over-stated the contribution of equity finance. 
The balance of evidence (including that of Whittington et al 1997 discussed earlier) 
therefore suggests that the observed changes in corporate financing patterns from the 
1980s to the 1990s for these countries are likely to be genuine rather than simply 
reflecting measurement biases of the earlier period. 
 
                                                          
15 This exercise for the 1990s is a much simpler version of the analysis of the measurement biases on 
the basis of the 1980s data carried out by Whittington et al 1997. 
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Finally, the relatively high use of equity financing by emerging market corporations 
in the 1980s and into the 1990s is also confirmed by the data reported in Table 8.  
This information comes from a completely different data set which provides 
aggregate levels of new equity and debt issues relative to various macro-economic 
benchmark variables for a group of developing and developed countries.  The data 
reported in table 8 gives new equity issues as a proportion of total stock market 
capitalisation.  The table shows higher levels of equity issues for a number of 
emerging markets compared with those for advanced countries.  The Korean case 
with extremely high levels of new equity issues is clearly an outlier. 
   
It may be useful at this stage to sum up the main conclusions of the above analysis of 
corporate financing patterns in emerging and mature markets during the 1980s and 
1990s. The main points are as follows. 
 
1. Contrary to a priori expectations and theoretical analysis, the observed 
corporate financing patterns in several leading emerging markets 
comprehensively reject the pecking order theory. The conceptual discussion in 
Section II concluded that, while good reasons exist to expect a pecking order 
for firms in mature markets, the reasons for expecting such a pattern for 
emerging market firms are stronger still.  Yet the results for the 1980s and 
1990s are quite unequivocal: emerging market firms use far more external 
rather than internal finance, and within external finance employ equity finance 
to a surprisingly large degree. Thus the analysis shows that the phenomenon 
of high reliance on external financing did not peter out but continued in the 
period studied in the 1990s , though in a less attenuated form.  
 
2. Evidence suggests that these results are unlikely to be due to possible 
measurement biases arising from the inadequacies of the available data for the 
1980s.  The more comprehensive data for the 1990s confirms these 
conclusions. 
 
3. The large observed differences between the financing patterns of emerging 
and mature markets arise mainly from the different methodologies which have 
 19
been used for examining these issues.  When the same methodology is used to 
study financing patterns in both groups of countries, the financing patterns are 
seen to be much closer. However, the theoretical anomaly still remains and is 
indeed compounded in the data for the 1990s.  
 
4. When the SH methodology is used for studying corporate financing patterns in 
advanced economies, the widely held belief that these corporations implement 
a pecking order may not be valid for all countries in all periods. At a 
minimum, the analysis of this paper suggests that evidence for the pecking 
order  is not robust.  With a different methodology which, it is argued here, is 
conceptually more suitable, the results change quite considerably.  The 
pecking order pattern in advanced economies is most evident when flow of 
funds data is used and the question of financing is considered from the 
perspective of the corporate sector as a whole rather than that of the individual 
firm. Since the theoretical foundation of the pecking order theory is the 
individual firm, rather than the corporate sector as a whole, the SH 
methodology embodying this perspective is therefore more appropriate. 
 
5. The foregoing four conclusions outlined in paragraphs 1-4 above are, 
however, based on limited data. The data for the 1990s, for example, covers a 
limited number of firms for two advanced countries and four developing 
countries. Until these findings are tested for a larger body of data, these 
conclusions must remain provisional. However, the fact that the anomalous 
results for the 1980s for developing country corporations continued to be valid 
in the 1990s does suggest that this phenomenon requires serious attention.  
 
 
16V  Corporate Finance, the Stock Market and Corporate Governance
 
The previous section has indicated that there is considerable evidence from different 
kinds of data, both at the aggregate and at the micro-economic levels, that the large 
emerging market firms have raised substantial amounts of funds on the stock market 
                                                          
16 The analysis of this section is based on Singh, Singh and Weisse (2002) and Singh (1999) 
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during the 1980s and 1990s.  In proportional terms during this period, equity 
financing of large firms from many emerging markets was greater than that of firms 
from advanced economies.  
 
In view of the large recourse to equity financing by developing country firms, stock 
markets might be expected to significantly affect corporate behaviour (for example, 
corporate policies with respect to the payment of dividends), as well as corporate 
governance (for example, the extent to which managers run the corporation in the 
interests of the shareholders or themselves). The stock market can affect corporate 
governance and behaviour directly as well as indirectly. The direct effect is through 
the stock market's own rules and regulations, for example requirements for listing and 
raising new issues. In these areas, emerging stock markets usually display 
considerable deficits in comparison with advanced country markets. Listing and 
disclosure requirements, for example, in advanced countries' stock markets tend to be 
more stringent and more actively enforced than those in developing country markets. 
 
V.1  The Pricing Mechanism 
 
However, more significantly, the stock market can influence corporate governance 
indirectly through its allocative and disciplinary mechanisms. Each of these channels 
is important.  
 
The market performs its allocative tasks basically by its pricing of corporate 
securities. In traditional textbook treatments of the subject, the liquid secondary 
equity market results in a better allocation of funds that results in more efficient and 
dynamic firms obtaining capital at lower cost.  Similarly, less efficient firms or firms 
in less dynamic industries face a higher cost of equity capital.  The result is the 
movement of funds to more efficient, productive firms that results in higher degrees 
of technological progress and economic growth.  
 
However, a more critical literature originating in the work of John Maynard Keynes 
has pointed out that the pricing process may not be as efficient as the textbooks 
suggest, but may instead be dominated by speculation.  James Tobin (1984) has 
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distinguished two concepts of share price efficiency on the stock market: information 
arbitrage efficiency (in the sense that all currently available information is rapidly 
incorporated into the share price) and fundamental valuation efficiency (share prices 
accurately reflect the future discounted earnings of the corporation).  While real world 
stock market prices may reflect the former, the critical school maintains that there are 
strong reasons to doubt that it always attains the latter, more important, criterion of 
efficiency.  The reasons for this are found in the psychology of stock market 
participants.17  As Keynes pointed out in his famous description of the beauty contest 
in the General Theory, often the art of the successful investor does not consist in 
appreciating fundamental values of corporations, but rather in guessing at the likely 
movements of other stock market participants.  Such a process leads to herding, 
myopia and fads that can lead stock market values to diverge significantly from 
underlying values (for a current example, note the rise and fall of technology shares 
on international stock markets).  The volatility associated with this process further 
reduces the capacity of share prices to transmit efficient signals to market 
participants.   
 
Experience from advanced countries suggests that the stock market may also 
encourage managers to pursue short-term profits at the expense of long-term 
investment since firms are obliged to meet quarterly or half-yearly earnings per share 
targets determined by market expectations. Any serious fall in such short-term 
performance will quickly be reflected in a lower share price making the firm 
vulnerable to take-over.  In the late 1980s and early 1990s, numerous analysts in the 
United States ascribed that country’s relatively poor comparative performance vis-à-
vis competitors with bank-based financial systems such as Japan and Germany to the 
short-termist demands of Wall Street resulting in lower investment in technological 
upgrading and new capacity.18  In a closely related but more general sense, the 
dominance of stock markets may result in the rules of the game being constructed in 
such a way that companies can rise or fall depending on their ability to engage in 
financial engineering rather than in developing new products or processes.  This is 
                                                          
17 Benjamin Graham, in his classic work on security analysis noted that "The stock market is a voting 
machine rather than a weighing machine." (Graham, 1934, p.452). 
18 See collection of studies in Porter 1992. See also Singh (2000). 
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often reflected within the firm itself in the dominance of managers trained in finance 
over those who come from other backgrounds such as engineering or marketing.   
 
Thus, the benefits of having large corporations dependent on a highly liquid equity 
market are far from being unambiguous, particularly from the perspective of good 
corporate governance (see further Bhide, 1994). 
 
V.2  Corporate Governance and Take-overs 
 
An efficient market for corporate control is thought to be the evolutionary endpoint of 
stock market development in that it obliges all managers to maximise shareholders' 
wealth.  The ability of an outside group of investors to acquire a corporation, often 
through a hostile bid, is the hallmark of the stock market-dominated U.S. and U.K. 
corporate and financial systems.  The textbook interpretation of take-overs is that they 
improve efficiency by transferring corporate assets to those who can manage them 
more productively.  Consequently, more effective managers emerge who can raise the 
firm’s profitability and share price.  Even if current managers are not replaced, an 
active market for corporate control presents a credible threat that inefficient managers 
will be replaced and thus ensures that the incumbent management actively seeks to 
maximize shareholder value and thereby raises corporate performance.  Even if 
quoted firms were not directly susceptible to changes in share prices because they 
finance themselves almost exclusively from internal finance (as the pecking order 
theory in its strong form implies) the managers can still be disciplined by the market 
for corporate control.  Furthermore, the textbooks suggest that, even if all firms are on 
the efficiency frontier, the amalgamation of some through the act of take-overs may 
lead to a better social allocation of resources via synergy.  
 
However, a critical school has developed a multifaceted critique that has increasingly 
questioned the above textbook version of the market for corporate control.  First, a 
number of analysts in the critical school have pointed out that in the real world the 
market for corporate control, even in advanced economies, has an inherent flaw in its 
operation: it is far easier for a large firm to take over a small one than the other way 
around (Singh, 1971, 1975, 1992, 2000).  In principle, it is possible that a small 
efficient firm may take over a larger and less efficient company (and to a degree this 
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occurred in the U.S. take-over wave of the 1980s through “junk bonds”), its incidence 
was very small (Hughes, 1991).      
 
This consideration is particularly important for developing countries like India where 
there are large, potentially predatory conglomerate groups (Singh, 1995, 1998).  
These could take over smaller, more efficient firms and thereby reduce potential 
competition to the detriment of the real economy.  In a take-over battle it is the 
absolute firepower (absolute size) that counts rather than the relative efficiency.  
Therefore, the development of an active market for corporate control may encourage 
managers to “empire-build” not only to increase their monopoly power but also to 
progressively shield themselves from take-over by becoming larger (see further 
Singh, 1975, 1992). 
 
Secondly, the efficient operation of the take-over mechanism requires that enormous 
amounts of information are widely available.  Specifically, market participants require 
information on the profitability of corporations under their existing management and 
what their prospective profitability would be under an alternative management if it 
were taken over.  It has been noted that such information is not easily available even 
in advanced countries and this informational deficit is likely to be greater in 
developing countries.   
 
Thirdly, take-overs are a very expensive way of changing management (Peacock and 
Bannock, 1991).  There are huge transactions costs associated with take-overs in 
countries like the U.S. and U.K. which hinder the efficiency of the take-over 
mechanism.  Given the lower income levels in the developing countries, these costs 
are likely to be proportionally heavier in these countries.  It should also be borne in 
mind that many countries with a long-term record of economic success such as Japan, 
Germany and France have not had an active market for corporate control and have 
thus avoided these costs, while still maintaining systems for disciplining managers.  
Furthermore, there is no evidence that corporate governance necessarily improves 
after take-overs.  This is for the simple reason that all take-overs are not disciplinary; 
in many of them the acquiring firm is motivated by empire-building considerations or 
even by asset-stripping.  
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 Fourthly, there is theoretical work (see for example Stein, 1989) which suggests that, 
even if managers wish to maximise shareholder wealth, it would pay them to be 
myopic in a world of take-overs and signal-jamming.  Thus, take-overs could 
exacerbate the already present tendencies towards short-termism in a stock market-
based system. 
 
Fifthly, it has been argued that take-overs can be used as a device to avoid honouring 
implicit contracts developed between workers and the former management (Shleifer 
and Summers, 1988). This point may be even stronger than that suggested by these 
authors, in that even the threat of disciplining take-overs by corporations maximising 
shareholder value may in any case undermine implicit agreements between current 
management and workers. This abandonment of implicit contracts can be argued to be 
socially harmful in that it discourages the accumulation of firm-specific human capital 
by workers.  The absence of strong worker-protection laws in many developing 
countries means that such considerations may be significant. 
 
These critiques of the market for corporate control have been based on the experience 
of advanced countries. There is every reason to believe, however, that they are likely 
to be even more relevant to potential take-over markets in developing countries.  
However, the take-over market in developing countries remains rudimentary because 
of the fact, noted earlier, that shareholding is not widely dispersed and standards of 
disclosure are not conducive to take-overs.  It is therefore not surprising that hostile 
take-overs are rare in developing countries: for example, in the last decade in India 
there have only been five or six such take-over attempts, not all of which were 
successful.  However, this situation may change if large international MNCs are 
allowed to engage in take-overs in developing countries.  Domestic firms, with their 
limited funds and relatively restricted access to international capital markets, would 
not be able to either compete with or to resist the MNCs.  (See further Singh, 2002). 
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VI  Stock market Development and Corporate Finance in India and the LLSV 
Thesis 
 
This section reports more fully on the expansion of the stock market and the financing of  
corporate growth in India during the last two decades. This is of interest in its own right 
as well as for being the experience of a classically 'repressed' economy in the McKinnon 
and Shaw sense, which decided to liberalise its financial sector in the 1980s and 90s. 
However, the Indian case is particularly useful to study with respect to the LLSV 
propositions on legal origins and corporate finance. Among emerging markets India is 
pre-eminently a common law country with a well developed system of laws and justice, 
litigious middle/upper classes where contracts are enforced through the legal machinery 
although, to be sure, there is a common complaint that the wheels of justice turn too 
slowly. Following the U.S., the country has a written constitution that combines the 
British legal tradition with the U.S. system of justice and Indian judges have shown 
themselves willing to take on class action suits as well as public interest litigation to curb 
the excesses of the executive branch of the government. India should therefore be a good 
laboratory for examining some of the LLSV propositions.  
 
The main relevant facts about the evolution of stock markets and the financing of 
corporate growth in India may be summarised as follows (Singh and Weisse 1998, Singh 
1998): 
 
a) While the Indian stock market was founded more than a century ago, from the 
time of independence in 1947 until the 1980s it had remained a sleepy backwater 
in the Indian financial system, with little scope for expansion in a regime 
dominated by state-directed credit. In 1980, the stock market capitalization ratio 
was only 5% of GDP. As a result of liberalization measures initiated in the 1980s, 
the ratio had risen to 13% by 1990. After the major change in government policy 
and the acceleration of the pace of liberalization in 1991 (see further, below), 
stock market growth was explosive. By the end of 1993, total market 
capitalization had reached 40%. 
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b) The number of shareholders and investors in mutual funds rose from 2 to 40 million 
between 1980 and 1993. In absolute size, this made the Indian investor population 
the second largest in the world, second only to the U.S. which had about 51 million 
investors at the time. 
 
c) In terms of the number of companies listed on the stock markets, there was again a 
very fast expansion in the 1980s and 1990s. As seen earlier the Indian stock market 
by the end of 1995 was the largest in the world, with nearly 8,000 listed companies. 
 
d) On the biggest Indian stock exchange at Bombay, the daily turnover of shares 
increased almost 30-fold during the 1980s and early 1990s – from 0.13 billion rupees 
in 1980-81 to 3.7 billion rupees in 1993-94. The average daily trading volume on the 
Bombay stock market in the early 1990s was about the same as that in London – 
about 45,000 trades a day. At the peak of stock market activity, trading occurred at 
double that rate. Put through in a short period of 2 hours, these deals on the Bombay 
stock exchange were reported to have the highest density of transactions in the world, 
behind only that of the Taiwan stock exchange (Mayya, 1995).  
 
e) During the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, Indian corporations raised large 
amounts of capital on a very active primary market for new issues to finance their 
growth.  In 1980, Rs 929 m. were raised through corporate securities issuance 
(Balasubramanian, 1993).  This figure had risen to Rs 2.5 bn by 1985, to a huge Rs 
123 bn by 1990, and by 1993-4, it reached Rs 225 bn, i.e. a 250-fold increase since 
1980.  By contrast the general price level in the economy rose less than fourfold 
during this period.  Another indicator of an extremely active primary market was that 
in 1994-5 nearly 1700 companies raised equity capital (either through direct offerings 
to the public or through rights issues); of these, 369 were new companies (RBI, 
1995). 
 
f) The Singh and Hamid (1992) and Singh (1995) studies referred to earlier indicated 
that for India the average corporation, during the 1980s, financed about 40 per cent of 
its growth of ‘net assets’ (the long-term capital employed in the firm) from internal 
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sources (i.e. retained profits) and 60 percent from external sources.  Of the latter, 
nearly a third came from equity issues and two-thirds from long-term debt. 
 
In the 1990s, unlike the case of the other sample emerging countries considered 
earlier, there was a modest increase in equity financing in India in the first half of the 
decade, compared with the benchmark figure for the 1980s. This difference between 
India and the other emerging markets can be attributed to the fact that financial 
liberalisation and related measures were implemented at an accelerated pace in India 
only in the early 1990s following the balance of payments crisis in 1991. These 
reforms produced among other things a stock market boom, which reached its peak in 
1995. This greatly lowered the cost of equity finance relative to that of debt and 
consequently several hundred Indian companies, existing as well as new ones, 
resorted to the stock market to raise finance. However, by the late 1990s, with the fall 
in share prices there was a sharp reduction in equity financing.19 Thus the increase in 
equity financing for India in the first half of the 1990s was quite in accord with the 
SH hypotheses as is the subsequent fall recorded in other studies (see Pal (2001)).  
 
g) Although Indian stock market growth during the 1980s and until the mid-90s has 
been impressive, it is important to note that so has it been in several other leading 
emerging markets.  In Taiwan, market capitalization as a proportion of GDP rose 
from 11 per cent in 1981 to 74 per cent in 1991.  Similarly, between 1983 and 1993, 
the Chilean ratio rose from 13.2 to 78 per cent and the Thai from 3.8 to 55.8 per cent.  
To put these figures in an historical perspective, Mullins (1993) notes that it probably 
took the U.S. stock market 85 years (1810-95) to achieve a broadly similar increase 
in capitalization ratio, from 7 to 71 per cent. 
 
h) The Indian economic reforms of the 1990s have not only been associated with the 
vast expansion of stock market activity, but also with important steps to improve the 
functioning of the markets, to make them more transparent, and less subject to insider 
dealing and fraud.  Although the regulatory authority, the Securities and Exchange 
Board of India (SEBI), has apparently made some progress in a number of these 
                                                          
19 The World Scope data set analysed in this paper covers only the period 1992 - 1996. For a study of 
the evolution of financing patterns in the following years, see Pal (2001).  
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areas, it will be a long time before the Indian stock market loses its justly deserved 
reputation of being a “snake pit” to use Joshi and Little’s expressive phrase.  Indeed, 
notwithstanding SEBI’s valiant efforts, the Indian press continues to regale stories of 
fresh stock market scams.  
 
Apart from their other implications, these facts raise some important issues for the LLSV 
thesis. What the Indian case suggests is that there can be very quick but far-reaching 
changes in corporate finance and stock market development such as those which 
occurred in the country during the 1980s and in the early 1990s.  There was, however, no 
fundamental change in the basic legal framework or in the principles of company law, or 
for that matter in the degree of enforcement which preceded or accompanied these 
developments.  The government changed economic policy and direction in the 1980s and 
the long dormant stock market burst into life.  It turned into an important source for 
financing corporate growth as well as providing a vehicle for the savings of households.  
A similar mixture of changes in government policy and external economic environment 
occurred in a number of other emerging markets as well during the 1980s, leading to a 
very fast expansion of stock market activity: this happened both in civil law and in 
common law countries such as India. These enormous changes in economic policy and 
financial systems in the various emerging countries occurred in very different economic 
systems, cultural environments, and legal systems. There is clearly a complex 
interrelationship between these factors and there is no reason to single out the legal 
system as the dominant one. 
 
VII   Summary and Conclusion 
 
This paper has examined the relationship between corporate finance and corporate 
governance, as well as the important role of the stock market in linking the two 
phenomena. It has provided new information on corporate financing patterns in emerging 
markets during the 1990s and these have been systematically compared with the patterns 
observed in the benchmark SH studies for the 1980s. The paper has also briefly 
commented on the LLSV legal origin approach to corporate finance, governance and 
behaviour.  
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The central conclusion of this analysis is that the anomalous financing behaviour of 
emerging market corporations observed in the 1980s has broadly continued into the 
1990s; it has not petered out although it has been attenuated to some degree. These 
corporations still rely overwhelmingly on external sources rather than retained profits to 
finance the growth of their net assets.  The relative contribution of equity versus debt to 
total external financing changes over time and between countries in response to 
economic conditions. The results indicate that when the same methodology is used for 
comparing financing patterns between advanced and emerging markets, the differences 
between the two are much less sharp. The differences as well as the similarities in the 
financing patterns of the two groups nevertheless remain theoretically anomalous in a 
number of dimensions.  
 
Whether the large role of the stock market in financing corporate growth in emerging 
countries would lead to positive or negative changes in corporate governance and 
economic efficiency depends on (a) the efficiency of the pricing mechanism and (b) the 
take-over mechanisms on the real world stock markets. This paper has argued that there 
is a wealth of evidence that the former is often dominated by speculation, herding and 
fads that undermine its capacity to efficiently direct the allocation of resources.  It has 
also been suggested that the take-over mechanism is inherently flawed and an 
expensive method of changing corporate governance.  Furthermore, it was pointed out 
that the inadequacies and perverse incentives in both the pricing process and the take-
over mechanism are likely to be exacerbated in developing countries. 
 
In relation to the LLSV studies, the paper suggests that the legal origin approach is 
unable to account for the huge changes in corporate financing patterns and stock market 
development, which took place within emerging markets such as India in the 1980s and 
1990s.  Thus, even if we accepted that legal origin may explain some of the cross-
sectional variation between developing countries, it is not helpful in explaining the much 
more important structural changes that have taken place in these countries over the last 
two decades.  None of this is, however, to detract from the immense contribution LLSV 
have made to research on emerging markets in these areas. 
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In conclusion, it may be useful to draw attention to the recent examination by Gugler et 
al (2002) of the financing anomalies highlighted in this paper. The authors note that 
Singh's finding of a greater popularity for external financing for developing country 
corporations seems to contradict various hypotheses of why hierarchy of finance exist.  
Gugler et al provide an ingenious resolution to these as well as some other financing 
paradoxes in the literature, in terms of corporate governance institutions. Their empirical 
analysis indicates that the differences in corporate governance structure helps explain 
both differences in the sources of finance for investment across countries and differences 
in the returns on these investments. They argue that corporate governance institutions are 
weaker in developing than in developed countries which permits owner-managers in 
developing country corporations to issue equity to finance low return investments.  Thus, 
in this analysis, corporate governance is the independent variable that influences 
corporate financing patterns which is the dependent variable.  This is an important and 
thoughtful approach which greatly enriches the nascent literature on corporate 
governance in emerging markets. 
 
In view of the domestic and international policy significance of corporate governance 
issues for emerging countries outlined in the Introduction, it is essential that these issues 
be investigated scientifically and dispassionately so as to provide these countries with a 
solid analytical and empirical basis for policy.  With the pioneering contributions of 
LLSV, Gugler et al. and others reviewed in this paper, this process seems to have begun 
in earnest.  In that sense this paper represents the beginning of an exciting research 
programme rather than the end.  
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 Table 1. The financing of corporate growth in ten emerging markets during the  
1980s 
 
Country Internal finance External finance External finance 
LTD (equity) 
Brazil 56.4 36.0 7.7 
India 40.5 19.6 39.9 
Jordan 66.3 22.1 11.6 
Malaysia 35.6 46.6 17.8 
Mexico 24.4 66.6 9.0 
Pakistan 74.0 1.7 24.3 
Republic of Korea 19.5 49.6 30.9 
Thailand  27.7 NA NA 
Turkey 15.3 65.1 19.6 
Zimbabwe 58.0 38.8 3.2 
All 38.8 39.3 20.8 
F1 20.0* 31.4* 21.2* 
F2 16.69* 18.93* 6.38* 
 
Note:  
1. F-statistic for comparison of means across countries. ‘*’ implies rejection of the 
null hypothesis of the equality of means 
2. Bartlett-Box F-statistic for variance across countries. ‘*’ implies rejection of the 
null hypothesis of equality of variance. 
 
Source: Singh 1995. 
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Table 2:  Net sources of finance for Germany, Japan, U.K. and U.S.,  
   1970 – 1989    (percentages) 
 
 
 
Germany Japan U.K. U.S.  
Internal 80.6 69.3 97.3 91.3 
Bank finance 11.0 30.5 19.5 16.6 
Bonds -0.6 4.7 3.5 17.1 
New equity 0.9 3.7 -10.4 -8.8 
Trade Credit -1.9 -8.1 -1.4 -3.7 
Capital transfers 8.5 - 2.5 - 
Other 1.5 -0.1 -2.9 -3.8 
Statistical adj. 0.0 0.0 -8.0 -8.7 
 
Source: Corbett and Jenkinson (1994) 
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Table 3: Sources and uses of funds in non-financial corporations expressed 
as percentage of each year's total investment, United States, 1988-1997 
 
 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Uses           
1. Capital 
expenditures 
74 87 87 98 73 81 80 77 81 83 
1. Investment in 
net working 
capital and  
26 13 13 2 27 19 20 23 19 17 
a2. other uses  
3. Total investment 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Sources           
4. Internally 
generated cash
81 87 90 112 88 88 86 78 89 85 
b
5. Financial deficit 
(3-4); equals 
required external 
financing  
19 13 10 -12 12 12 14 22 11 15 
Financial deficit 
covered by
          
c
                                                          
 
Source:  Brealy and Myers (1999) 
a changes in short term borrowing are shown under net increase in debt. “Other uses” are net of any 
increase in miscellaneous liabilities and any statistical discrepancy. 
 
b net income plus depreciation less cash dividends paid to stock holders. 
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6. Net stock issues -26 -27 -14 3 6 4 -7 -8 -9 -14 
7. Net increase in 
debt 
45 40 24 -14 7 8 21 30 20 30 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
c columns may not add up due to rounding 
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Table 4 
Balanced sample: Sources of financing of growth of Total Assets, 1992 – 1996 
Weighted averages are calculated as the sum (over companies) of each source of finance over the sample period, 1992-96, divide by the sum of 
the growth in total assets over this period. Unweighted averages are the average of the sum (over companies) of each source of finance in each 
year, divided by the sum of the growth of total assets. The Balanced samples for the four countries are as follows: India = 115, Malaysia = 130, 
Thailand = 98, Korea = 95, U.S.A.= 261, U.K. =752 
 
 India Malaysia Thailand Korea* U.S.A. U.K. 
 Weight
ed 
Unweighte
d 
Weight
ed 
Unweighte
d 
Weight
ed 
Unweighte
d 
Weight
ed 
Unweighte
d 
Weight
ed 
Unweighte
d 
Weighted Unweighte
d 
Retentions 24.2 23.1 20.4 25.3 13.0 13.3 5.5 5.7 31.8 35.2 12.6 16.7 
External 
finance 
75.8 76.9 79.6 74.7 87.0 86.7 94.5 94.3 68.2 64.8 87.3 83.2 
 Shares 29.3 31.2 13.2 14.6 9.5 9.6 12.7 16.1 8.8 8.6 34.8 60.6 
Other** 1.7 2.5 8.3 9.1 6.3 6.3 2.0 -2.3 0.7 1.9 -5.3 -13.5 
Debt finance 44.7 43.3 58.1 51.0 71.2 70.8 79.8 80.6 58.7 54.3 57.8 36.1 
Long-term debt 12.1 13.2 13.9 12.9 34.0 34.0 33.0 32.4 30.6 31.4 8.9 14.9 
Short-term debt 32.7 30.1 44.2 38.1 37.2 36.9 46.8 48.2 28.1 22.9 48.9 21.2 
Trade credit 8.3 8.3 7.2 6.4 6.2 6.4 12.5 13.1 9.9 10.9 27.6 33.0 
 
* Unweighted ratios for Korea are calculated over the 3 year period, 1994-96. Some unusually large ratios for 1993 were omitted from the 
overall average. 
**  Other includes revaluation reserves, minority interests, preferred shares and non-equity reserves.
 Table 5 
Balanced sample: Sources of financing of growth of Net Assets, 1992 – 1996 
Weighted averages are calculated as the sum (over companies) of each source of finance over the sample period, 1992-96, divide by the sum of 
the change in net assets over this period. Unweighted averages are the average of the sum (over companies) of each source of finance in each 
year, divided by the sum of the growth of net assets. Net assets are total assets less current liabilities. The Balanced samples for the four 
countries are as follows: India = 115, Malaysia = 130, Thailand = 98, Korea = 95, U.S.A.= 261, U.K. = 752. 
 
Growth of net 
assets 
India Malaysia Thailand Korea U.S.A. U.K. 
 Weight
ed 
Unweighte
d 
Weight
ed 
Unweighte
d 
Weight
ed 
Unweighte
d 
Weight
ed 
Unweighte
d 
Weight
ed 
Unweighte
d 
Weight
ed 
Unweighte
d 
Retentions 36.0 34.8 36.6 39.6 20.7 20.3 10.3 15.1 44.2 45.3 24.8 28.5 
External finance 64.0 65.2 63.4 60.4 79.3 79.8 89.7 84.9 55.8 54.7 75.2 71.5 
Shares 43.5 43.4 23.6 23.5 15.2 15.3 24.0 20.9 12.3 10.6 68.1 75.8 
Other* 2.6 3.4 14.8 14.5 10.0 10.4 3.7 19.5 1.0 1.1 -10.3 -7.9 
Long-term debt 17.9 18.5 25.0 22.4 54.2 54.1 62.0 44.4 42.5 43.0 17.5 3.6 
 
• Other includes revaluation reserves, minority interests, preferred shares and non-equity reserves. 
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Table 6:  
Balanced sample: Unweighted average sources of financing of growth of net assets: 1992-1996 
The balance samples for the four countries are: India = 115, Malaysia = 130, Thailand = 98, Korea = 95  
 India (%) Malaysia (%) Thailand (%) Korea (%)     
Net asset growth 37.2 32.9 39.7 20.6     
Retentions 36.9 56.9 48.0 13.7     
External finance 64.9 46.8 55.6 96.5     
Long term debt 40.6 14.4 36.1 67.8     
Shares 24.0 18.2 15.9 21.1     
Other 0.3 14.2 3.6 7.6     
Statistical adjustment -1.9 -3.8 -3.5 -10.2     
         
Note: All cases where average annual rates of growth of net assets was less than one percent were rejected    
since low values of growth (the denominator) would lead to high values for the whole ratio.  Internal and external   
finance were constrained to those between -100 per cent and +200 per cent (see Singh 1995, TP2).  Internal   
and external finance were calculated as in Singh (1995), TP2, page 39.  Note also that external finance of net   
assets by equity (new shares) was calculated directly as against the residual used in TP2.     
The statistical adjustments in the table arise from the constraints placed on the financial ratios.   
   
  Source: World Scope database 
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Table 7:   
Balanced sample: Unweighted average sources of financing of growth of net assets: 1992-1996 
The balance samples for the four countries are: India = 115, Malaysia = 130, Thailand = 98, Korea = 95  
 India (%) Malaysia (%) Thailand (%) Korea (%)     
Retentions 36.9 56.9 48.0 13.7     
External finance 63.1 43.1 52.0 86.3     
Long term debt 40.6 14.4 36.1 67.8     
Shares 22.5 28.6 15.9 18.5     
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0     
         
Note:  This table was constructed using Singh (1995), TP2 residual method. Retentions and long-term debt were  
 calculated directly and new shares were the residual sources of funds.  
  
Source: World Scope database  
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Table 8. (New Equity Issues)/ 
(Stock Market Capitalization) 
Ratios (%) 
                
 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Emerging Markets                 
Argentina 3.4 1.7 1.3 0.7 1.2 1.5 3.4 2.4 1.1 0.5 5.6 1.4 1.7 2.5 1.9 0.6 
Brazil 4.5 1.4 3 1.4 1.6 1.2 2.8 2.3 1.2 1.5 4.8 1.9 2.1 0.8 1.4 1.4 
Chile na na na na 3.9 14.6 6.1 17.4 8.1 2.9 1.9 0.7 1.6 1.8 0.1 1.9 
China .. .. .. .. .. .. .. na na na na 0.4 0.1 0.1 0 na 
Colombia 2.6 6.6 7.5 24.5 10.5 15.5 9.6 8.4 7.1 5.1 4.1 1.7 1.9 2.2 3.9 1.1 
Hungary .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. na 0.1 50 12.4 24.3 42.9 
India 0 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.4 0.5 na 
Indonesia 89.6 80.6 21.3 38.9 0.3 0 0.4 0 10.4 52.3 38.6 7.3 8.9 7.1 10.3 5.9 
Jamaica 0 0 1.9 0 0 0 2.1 0.2 0.7 0.6 0.2 0.1 1.4 3.2 0.8 0.2 
Jordan 9.9 9.2 9.1 6.3 0.7 1.1 1.1 3.1 0.8 1.8 0.8 1.2 2.4 6.7 14.4 10.2 
Kenya .. .. .. .. na na 1.6 0.4 2.7 3 2.9 1.4 2.4 0.1 1.6 0 
Malaysia 0.5 2.6 1.9 2.2 4.4 1.5 1.1 1.9 1.6 1.5 6.5 1.7 3.3 0.6 1.4 1.6 
Mauritius .. .. .. .. ..  .. .. .. .. 4.2 2.2 25.8 1 8.9 7.2 
Mexico 0.2 0.8 0 0 0.1 0.7 0.3 5.8 0.5 0 0.6 3.4 1.2 1.2 1.4 0 
Pakistan 7 15.9 5.8 10.5 11.5 4 8.7 5.5 8.5 11 14.5 11.4 6.2 10.7 8.1 na 
Peru 0 0.2 0 0 0.1 0.5 3.6 0.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Philippines 5.5 21.3 1.4 1.1 2 1 0.4 2.6 2.2 1.2 4.6 3.8 0.9 1 2.7 2.5 
Portugal na na na na na na 21.8 9.8 19.8 12.8 29.6 22.2 33.5 20.7 12.4 23.3 
Sri Lanka na na na na na na na 0.8 2.5 1.5 1.4 1.1 4.9 4.2 7.8 3.5 
Thailand 8.4 6 7.8 8.4 21.9 9.7 3 21.7 4.9 20.1 21.9 17.6 15.4 1 2.5 1.8 
Tunisia na na na na na na 42.6 23.5 25.7 32.2 77.8 58 64.6 44.9 16.6 22.8 
Turkey 0 0 5.8 16.1 18.5 19.7 16.2 6.8 23.2 6.8 8.3 7 7.9 2.4 6.4 5.4 
Venezuela 12.9 5.1 6.5 9.1 na 12.8 18.5 9.8 43.4 55 6.1 11 10.4 10.1 17.2 18.3 
Asian Tigers                 
Hong Kong na na na na na na na na na na 2.9 3.9 7.6 2.6 2 1.6 
Korea 151.9 120.8 140.3 264 153.7 81.4 87.6 92.7 134.4 180.2 54.3 42.9 25.9 19.2 27.2 43.9 
Taiwan 7.7 3.7 6.5 2.4 3.9 2.5 2.3 2.1 0.9 0.6 1.2 1.6 2 1.3 1.3 1.7 
Singapore 0.9 0.8 0.8 2.2 2.4 1 0.1 2.1 1.7 1 2.4 0.8 1.4 2.7 1 0.3 
G4 Industrial Countries                 
Germany 5.3 3.9 3.5 3.5 2.8 2.1 2.9 3.1 1.7 2.8 4.9 2 3.2 2.5 3.8 2.9 
Japan 1.8 2.6 2.1 1.3 1.6 1.1 0.8 1.5 1.7 2.5 1.5 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.3 
U.K. 1.1 2.1 1 1.6 0.9 1.8 2.6 3.8 1.3 1.4 0.8 1.9 1.1 2.1 1.8 0.8 
U.S.A. 1.6 1.9 2 2.7 1.2 1.5 2.3 2.1 1.4 0.9 1.2 1.7 1.9 2.3 1.3 1.1 
 
Source: Aylward and Glen 
(2002). 
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